He made the remarks after an attack on an Israeli-managed tanker off the coast of Oman, for which Tel Aviv and its allies blamed Iran. To be sure, Israel has in the past carried out relatively limited operations against Iran—such as raids on Iranian allies in Syria and nuclear sabotage —and may continue to do so in the future. But to what extent should we believe Tel Aviv is truly ready and willing to launch a strike on Iran because of advances in the Iranian nuclear program, knowing full well that this is likely to push the two countries and their allies into war?
The political and military constraints on Israeli decision-makers suggests such a military showdown is highly unlikely. To speak of an imminent and undisguised IDF strike deep inside Iranian territory is to overlook a long-established norm that has for decades governed U.
Here, Barak spelled out the paradigm that has shaped—and will likely continue to shape—the contours of Israeli action against Iran. Even during the military interventionism of the George W. Bush presidency, Israel did not have a blank check to do as it pleased.
As Barak notes in his memoirs, when Bush learned in of Israeli efforts to purchase heavy munitions from the United States, he confronted Barak and then-premier Ehud Olmert. We expect you not to do it. I wanted it to be clear. He recalls how then-U. These political realities make it unlikely Israel will pursue an overt strike on Iran.
Just as important, however, are the military constraints that Israel faces. But this prodigious superiority will be rendered far less consequential in the event of an all-out war that lures the IDF ground forces into the battlefield.
Israel could become a villa in a burning jungle. But the talk about the war serves many purposes, including domestic political ones. He [the Creator] brings problems on Israel in order to unite the People of Israel. For others, the decision to strike Iran depends greatly on the possible fallout from military action. According to all estimates, the probability that such aerial infiltration would go undetected is marginal, and the working assumption is that a significant number of aircraft will not be returning to their base safely; we shall then have to contend not with one abducted soldier in Gaza, but rather, with 10 pilots in Iranian captivity.
This does not mean that the military option should be completely eliminated, yet it must come as a last resort, when we truly feel the sword against our throat. The Iranians, for their part, have sounded a note of defiance in the face of Israeli threats. Sa'adollah Zare'ei said on Saturday that in a few days time, the Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak will retract his recent remarks about an imminent military strike against Iran Voices from the Gulf media have struck an ambiguous tone regarding news of the plan, although the preference, at least in the short term is for actions short of war.
When it comes to curtailing Iran's nuclear programme, threats and actions rarely intersect. But every so often those shaking their fists in fury go further. Israel's test on Wednesday of a long-range missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to Iran is one such time.
Will Iran call a momentary halt — for a week, a month, a year — when it becomes a nuclear threshold state , or will it forge full-speed ahead straight toward a bomb? The bitter truth is that at the present juncture there are only two possibilities for Israel, both of them awful: Either bomb or shut up and live with a nuclear Iran. Option one: In recent decades, Israel has spent countless billions on advanced Fs and Fs, on Fs, on high-tech bombs, on refueling jets and on countless other items precisely to make possible an assault against the Iranian nuclear program.
The Syrians did not respond. But the chances that Iran would take it lying down are near zero. This would mean an all-out war in the Middle East that would necessitate an Israeli ground offensive deep into Lebanon and maybe into Gaza , and strikes against additional strategic installations and cities throughout Iran. Iran might persevere in such a war for years as it did against Iraq in the s , while trying to revive its nuclear program while Israel would do its best to suppress a revived Iranian nuclear program.
But there is no way of knowing. Option two: This is certainly a frightening scenario, but possibly less frightening than the alternative: a nuclear Iran with which Israel must live for decades. On the maritime shipping side, Israel is at something of a geographical disadvantage. It has good access to the Red Sea through its own naval port at Eilat but further afield Iran has the upper hand, thanks to its long Gulf coastline and Houthi proxies in Yemen.
In Syria and Lebanon there is always the option for Iran to deploy its proxies to launch missile strikes against Israel but this is extremely risky. Israel has made it clear the magnitude of its response and where it would land: in Iran. John Raine, an expert on transnational terrorism with the International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS says Israel's superior intelligence capabilities mean Iran has to content itself with "blunt" responses through its proxies.
The Iranians usually have the asymmetric advantage but with Israel they are being outboxed. The Israelis have both a longer reach, faster footwork and when they decide to strike bluntly, as they have been doing in Syria, they hit harder. Iran nuclear crisis in words. After Trump, what will Biden do about Iran? Image source, EPA. Natanz is heavily protected, with its most sensitive machinery housed deep underground. Iran's nuclear programme. Image source, Getty Images.
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